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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tributed directly or indirectly is immaterial. It has been held that if
in the act which precedes the injury something unforeseen, unex-
pected or unusual occurs which produces the.injury, then the injury
may be said to have resulted through accidental means.5 The govern-
ing principle is well stated to be that "if there is no active disease, but
merely a frail general condition, so that powers of resistance are
easily overcome, or merely a tendency to disease which is started up
and made operative, whereby death results, then there may be recov-
ery even though the accident would not have caused that effect upon
a healthy person in a normal state." 6 In determining the liability of
the insurer in actions of this type, the doctrine of following the chain
of causation is properly restricted by the courts to the terms of the
contract as contemplated by the parties.7
R.L.
INSURANcE-FALsITY OF MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS VI-
TIATES POLICY-SECTION 58, INSURANCE LAW CONSTRUED.-Plain-
tiff beneficiary under her husband's life insurance policy upon his
death brought this action for $10,000 on the policy. Defendant denied
liability on the ground that the plaintiff's husband gave false answers
to questions in regard to previous consultation with and treatment by
physicians. Plaintiff contended the answers to such questions were
truthfully made to the defendant's local agent and medical examiner
and that they had full knowledge of the facts although the answers
as contained in the written application were found to be false. The
plaintiff claims that the defendant is not deceived and the represen-
tations, though material, are not fraudulent. Held, for defendant.
Minsker v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 254
N. Y. 333, 172 N. E. - (1930).
Prior to the enactment of section 58 of the Insurance Lawlthe case
'Mutual Accident Assn. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755 (1888) ;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 11 F. (2nd) 486 (C. C. A., 4th), 59 A. L. R.
1240 (1926) ; Western Com. Travelers' Assn. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401 (C. C. A.,
8th), 40 L. R. A. 653 (1898).
'Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., at 85. quoting Rugg, Ch. J., in
Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558,
at 564, 124 N. E. 517, 520 (1919).
Schwartz v. Commercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Assn. of America,
254 N. Y. , 172 N. E. , decided June 3. 1930, aff'g 227 App. Div. 711, id.
132 Misc. 200 (1928); Lewis v. Ocean Accident & G. Corp., 224 N. Y. 18, 20,
120 N. E. 56, 7 A. L. R. 1129 (1918).
'N. Y. Insurance Law, sec. 58 (Laws of 1906, ch. 326) provides in
part "that every policy of insurance issued or delivered within the state on or
after the first day of January, 1907, by any life insurance corporation doing
business within the state, shall contain the entire contract between the parties,
and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to any constitution,
by-laws, rules, application or any other writings, unless the same are indorsed
upon or attached to the policy when issued; and all statements purporting to be
made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations
and not warranties. Any waiver of the provisions of this section shall be void."
RECENT DECISIONS
of Sternaman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company2 was authority
upon the question. In that case the insured made truthful answers
to all questions asked by the medical examiner, who failed to record
them as given and omitted an important part, stating that it was
unimportant. There the beneficiary was allowed to show the answers
actually given, in order to defeat the claim of forfeiture made by the
insurer on account of the falsity of the answers as recorded and this
in spite of the fact that it was agreed in the application that the
medical examiner employed and paid by the insurer only should not
be its agent but solely the agent of the insured.3 A breach of war-
ranty contained in an application for insurance prior to the enact-
ment of section 58 constituted a defense to a claim upon the policy
although the warranty related to an immaterial matter. A misrepre-
sentation contained in the application, on the other hand, only became
a defense if it related to a material matter. The Legislature in
enacting section 58 of the Insurance Law, apparently had for its
purpose to change the law in regard to these two points. The Court
in the instant case has definitely decided, in interpreting this statute
that the law is the direct converse of Sternaman v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. and a long line of cases decided prior to January 1,
1907.4 The rule of agency was extended too far in holding that oral
statements made to insurance agents and examiners should be binding
on the company when the applicant in his written statements gave
false answers. The law as it now stands appears to be more reason-
able and just. The applicant having the knowledge of the true state
of affairs ' should be made to state them truthfully to a company
whose only means of information, upon which they assume a large
risk, is the applicant's word.' The plaintiff here proceeded under the
law as it was prior to 1907-the law is now that a disclosure to the
defendant's agent or physical examiner is not binding upon the
defendant insurance company and the plaintiff cannot recover upon
the grounds of disclosure to such agent or physician. It should be
noted that the statute applies only to life insurance companies and
not to other insurance corporations or associations. 6
H. M. B.
2170 N. Y. 13, 62 N. E. 763 (1902).
2 Cf. Flynn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 78 N. Y. 568 (1879); Grattan v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 374 (1883; O'Brien v. Home Benefit
Society, 117 N. Y. 310, 318, 22 N. E. 954 (1889); O'Farrel v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 168 N. Y. 592, 60 N. E. 1113 (1901).
'Supra Note 3.
'The Court states, "When an insured received a policy, it is his duty to
read it or have it read, and if an application incorporated therein does not
contain correct answers to the questions asked by the medical examiner it is his
duty to have it corrected. In such circumstances recovery will no longer be
permitted because the medical examiner incorrectly recorded the applicant's
answers or because the insured was unable to read or neglected to read the
policy."
'Baumann v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 225 N. Y. 480, 122 N. E.
628 (1919).
